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Constitutional Cases 2010:  
An Overview 
Patrick Monahan* and Chanakya Sethi** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of 
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 14th Annual Constitu-
tional Cases Conference held on April 15, 2011, examines the constitu-
tional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the calendar 
year 2010.1 The Court handed down 69 judgments last year, the second-
lowest number over the last 10 years.2 Constitutional cases, however, 
made up an unusually high 36 per cent of the Court’s docket in 2010 (25 
of the 69 decisions), representing an approximately 50 per cent increase 
over the average in recent years.3 It was a significant year, with important 
decisions concerning Charter remedies, freedom of speech, the right to 
counsel, the division of powers, and the interpretation of First Nations 
treaties. A large majority of the constitutional cases (17 of 25 cases) 
concerned Charter rights.4 Federalism cases made up 20 per cent (5 of 25 
                                                                                                             
* Vice President-Academic and Provost, York University, and Professor, Osgoode Hall 
Law School. 
** J.D. candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1  A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the inter-
pretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2  The Court decided 70 cases in 2009, 74 in 2008 and 58 in 2007; its 10-year average is 77. 
Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 2000-2010, online: 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/html/index-eng.asp> [hereinafter “Statistics Bulletin”]. 
3  In 2007, constitutional cases made up 28 per cent of decisions (16 of 58); in 2008, 16 per 
cent (12 of 74); in 2009, 24 per cent (17 of 70). 
4  R. v. S. (J.Z.), [2010] S.C.J. No. 1, 2010 SCC 1, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“JZS”]; Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr II”]; R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 
S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nasogaluak”]; R. v. Beaulieu, [2010] S.C.J. No. 7, 2010 SCC 7, 
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 248 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Beaulieu”]; R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, 2010 SCC 
8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morelli”]; R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 
2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Post”]; Toronto Star Newspapers 
Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21, 2010 SCC 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
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cases) of the judgments,5 followed by Aboriginal law cases, which made 
up the remaining 12 per cent (3 of 25 cases).6 
Though the Court has generally reduced or held steady the time it 
takes to consider leave applications and to schedule hearings, the average 
time taken to render a decision after a hearing now stands at 7.7 months 
— a new record after last year’s high of 7.4 months.7 Taken together with 
the downward trend in the number of cases heard, it would appear the 
Court is adopting a more deliberative approach to its decision-making, 
taking more time to release fewer decisions.  
As usual, the Chief Justice remains the most prolific author of consti-
tutional judgments, crafting a total of 13 opinions, including nine 
majority opinions, more than twice any other justice.8 On the other end 
of the spectrum, however, Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ. authored 
just one majority constitutional opinion each and Rothstein J. authored 
none. The three Quebec justices — LeBel, Deschamps, Fish JJ. — were 
the principal authors of dissents in 2010, with four such opinions each. 
                                                                                                             
“Torstar”]; R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Conway”]; Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CLA”]; R. v. Nolet, [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 24, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nolet”]; Vancouver (City) v. 
Ward, [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”]; R. v. 
Cornell, [2010] S.C.J. No. 31, 2010 SCC 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cornell”]; 
R. v. Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Sinclair”]; R. v. McCrimmon, [2010] S.C.J. No. 36, 2010 SCC 36, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 402 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “McCrimmon”]; R. v. Willier, [2010] S.C.J. No. 37, 2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Willier”]; Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] S.C.J. No. 
41, 2010 SCC 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Globe and Mail”]; and R. v. Gomboc, 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 55, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gomboc”]. 
5  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, 2010 SCC 38, [2010] 2 
S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and 
Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, 2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“COPA”]; NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’ 
Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, 2010 SCC 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”]; 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family Services 
of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, 2010 SCC 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Native 
Child”]; and Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, 2010 SCC 61, 
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “AHRA Reference”]. 
6  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses, [2010] S.C.J. No. 17, 2010 SCC 17, [2010] 1 
S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moses”]; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carrier Sekani”]; 
and Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 
S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Salmon”]. 
7  Statistics Bulletin, supra, note 2. 
8  The Chief Justice also authored one dissent, two concurrences, and one plurality opinion. 
For the purposes of these calculations, when two justices authored a particular opinion, each is given 
an authorship credit. Per curiam opinions, however, are excluded from the count. 
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With the exception of three cases decided by a panel of seven justices, all 
of the 2010 constitutional cases were decided by the full bench of the 
Court, as has been the clear preference of the McLachlin Court.9  
II. CHARTER CASES 
The Court was not receptive to claims under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms10 in 2010, with the claimant succeeding in just 
18 per cent of cases (3 of 17).11 The Court dismissed the claim in each of 
the remaining 14 cases,12 though in three of those 14, it remitted certain 
statutory and common law questions to a lower tribunal for further 
adjudication.13 Significantly, the success rate in 2010 was well below the 
McLachlin Court’s average of 42 per cent (66 out of 156 cases since 
2000). 
The 17 cases decided in 2010 evidence a strong reluctance on the 
part of the Court to use the Charter in the first instance to address the 
claims before it. Instead, in a broad range of cases — from Charter 
remedies to access to information and journalist-source privilege to 
search and seizure — the Court instead turned first to statutory interpre-
tation and common law rules, albeit infused by “Charter values”, to reach 
its decisions. This doctrine of “constitutional avoidance”14 reflects an 
incremental and pragmatic approach, one which reflects a sensitivity on 
the part of the Court for its relationship with the legislative and executive 
branches. 
1. Charter Remedies 
The Court decided four remedies cases last year, all of which were 
unanimous. This quartet yields the most significant developments in 
section 24(1) jurisprudence since the Court’s landmark decision in 
                                                                                                             
9  The three exceptions — Beaulieu, Morelli and Cornell — were s. 8 cases that reached the 
Court as of right. Notably, however, two of the three resulted in a split panel, voting 4-3. 
10  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
11  See Khadr II; Morelli; and Ward, supra, note 4. 
12  See JZS; Nasogaluak; Beaulieu; National Post; Torstar; Conway; CLA; Nolet; Cornell; 
Sinclair; McCrimmon; Willier; Globe and Mail; and Gomboc, id. 
13  See Conway; CLA; and Globe and Mail, id. 
14  For an analogous U.S. approach, see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 
288 at 347 (1936) (Brandeis J., concurring). 
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Doucet-Boudreau15 nearly a decade ago. In Khadr II, the Court limited 
itself to a declaratory remedy in deference to the Crown prerogative. In 
Nasogaluak, the Court deferred to boundaries defined in a statutory 
scheme while leaving an exception for section 24(1) in only the rarest of 
cases. In Conway, the Court again deferred to the boundaries established 
by statute, this time in the administrative tribunal context. Finally, in 
Ward, the Court broke new ground in recognizing the availability of 
constitutional damages, but made clear that such damages would be 
unavailable where they risked chilling good governance. Taken together, 
these four cases suggest an emerging theme: Charter remedies are widely 
available in the abstract, but whether they will be “appropriate and just” 
in particular circumstances depends heavily on the will of legislatures. 
The watchword it seems is deference, with 2010 perhaps best character-
ized as the “Year of Restraint”. 
(a)  Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr 
Khadr II was one of the most highly anticipated cases on the Court’s 
docket going in 2010. However, the Court’s short, 48-paragraph decision, 
rendered per curiam, appears to raise as many questions as it answers. 
The facts of the case are well known: Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, 
has been detained by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, since 
2002, when he was a minor. In 2004, he was charged with war crimes but 
never taken to trial. Four years later, the Court held that Canada’s 
participation in the U.S. detention process constituted a violation of 
international human rights law and, consequently, section 7. Subse-
quently, Khadr made repeated requests that the Canadian government 
seek his repatriation but the Prime Minister said he would not do so, 
leading Khadr to seek judicial review. The Federal Court held that under 
the special circumstances of this case, Canada had a duty to protect 
Khadr under section 7 and ordered the government to request his 
repatriation.  
In crafting its remedy — the more significant aspect of the decision16 
— the Court adopted a cautionary approach and articulated two chief 
                                                                                                             
15  Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, 2003 
SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”]. 
16  As for the Charter breach, the Court concluded that “Canada’s active participation in 
what was at the time an illegal regime has contributed and continues to contribute to Mr. Khadr’s 
current detention …”: Khadr II, supra, note 4, at para. 21. 
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concerns with the lower court’s order. First, the order gave “too little 
weight” to the executive branch in its management of “complex and 
ever-changing circumstances, taking into account Canada’s broader 
national interests”.17 The Court distinguished the facts here from its 
holding in Burns18 because “Mr. Khadr is not under the control of the 
Canadian government; the likelihood that the proposed remedy will be 
effective is unclear; and the impact on Canadian foreign relations of a 
repatriation request cannot be properly assessed by the Court.”19 From 
this list, the Court’s comment regarding the impact on foreign relations is 
curious. In Burns, the Court dismissed the government’s arguments that 
the proposed remedy “would undermine Canada’s international obliga-
tions or good relations with neighbouring states” because there was “no 
suggestion in the evidence” that this would be the case.20 In Khadr II, 
however, the Court did not articulate what about the facts made such an 
assessment impracticable. Indeed, and moving to the Court’s second 
concern with the judgment below, the Court cautioned restraint with the 
order in light of the thin evidentiary record. Because the record provides 
a “necessarily incomplete picture of the range of considerations currently 
faced by the government in assessing Mr. Khadr’s request”, the Court 
held that “it would not be appropriate for the Court to give direction as to 
the diplomatic steps necessary to address the breaches of Mr. Khadr’s 
Charter rights.”21 In light of its finding that there had been a breach of 
section 7, however, it seems strange to effectively reward the state for 
proceeding with a thin record. Moreover, the Court’s approach is inter-
nally inconsistent because, at the section 7 stage, the Court drew infer-
ences adverse to the state when faced with a dearth of evidence.22  
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the proper remedy is declara-
tory relief,”23 leaving it to the government to determine what actions 
should be taken to vindicate Khadr’s Charter rights. Those questions, 
however, are now moot: 10 months after Khadr II was handed down, 
                                                                                                             
17  Id., at para. 39. 
18  United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Burns”]. 
19  Khadr II, supra, note 4, at para. 43. 
20  Burns, supra, note 18, at para. 136. 
21  Khadr II, supra, note 4,  at para. 44. 
22  Id., at para. 21. 
23  Id., at para. 46. 
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Khadr struck a plea agreement with the United States and is expected to 
return to Canada later this year.24 
(b)  R. v. Nasogaluak 
In Nasogaluak, the Court articulated a preference for “a general rule” 
that “it is neither necessary nor useful to invoke s. 24(1) of the Charter to 
effect an appropriate reduction of sentence to account for any harm 
flowing from unconstitutional acts of state agents consequent to the 
offence charged.”25 That conclusion is significant in cases where a 
mandatory minimum sentence is involved, because it effectively fore-
closes the possibility of a so-called “constitutional exemption”, which 
would allow a trial judge to impose a sentence lower than the minimum 
as a remedy for a Charter infringement suffered by the accused. The case 
involved an appeal by an accused whose sentence was reduced as a 
remedy for Charter breaches that he endured at the time of his arrest and 
detention. At trial, the judge concluded that the accused’s injuries — 
several broken ribs and a punctured lung at the hands of the police — 
amounted to a breach of his section 7 rights justifying a section 24(1) 
remedy of a conditional discharge.26  
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court focused on the statutory sen-
tencing provisions in the Criminal Code27 over section 24(1).28 Because 
those provisions afford courts “broad discretion … to craft a fit sentence 
that reflects all the factual minutiae of the case”, LeBel J. concluded that 
a court could fashion a suitable remedy for a Charter breach in the form 
of a sentence reduction without recourse to section 24(1).29 Though many 
Canadian courts have granted sentence reductions under section 24(1) as 
Charter remedies, LeBel J. suggested that these precedents “may not 
have been completely mindful that events which justify findings of 
                                                                                                             
24  Paul Koring, “Deal sees Khadr plead guilty to murder; Onetime child soldier agrees to 
plea ‘in exchange for the Canadian government agreeing to repatriate him back to Canada’” The 
Globe and Mail (October 26, 2010) A22; Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2011] F.C.J. No. 339, 
2011 FCA 92, at para. 1 (F.C.A.) (“As a result of the prison sentence imposed on the respondent 
following the guilty plea … the appeal is moot.”). 
25  Nasogaluak, supra, note 4, at para. 5. 
26  The trial judge — ”somewhat surprisingly”, as LeBel J. put it for the Court — also found 
a s. 11(d) infringement. He declined to find any s. 12 infringement, however. The Court of Appeal 
and Supreme Court focused on the s. 7 breach. Id., at paras. 15-18. 
27  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
28  Specifically, ss. 718-718.2. 
29  Nasogaluak, supra, note 4, at para. 47. 
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Charter breaches may also be circumstances which can legitimately form 
part of the analytical process leading to a fit sentence under the provi-
sions of the Criminal Code”.30  
There is, of course, a key substantive difference between reliance 
on internal Criminal Code provisions as opposed to section 24(1) in 
order to remedy a Charter breach: the matter of the so-called “constitu-
tional exemption”. The Code’s sentencing provisions do not provide a 
pathway to a sentence below the mandatory minimum, thus generating 
interest in a constitutional workaround. In its earlier holding in Fergu-
son,31 however, the Court explained at great length its hesitation in 
allowing case-by-case exemptions to mandatory minimums under 
section 24(1). A unanimous Court concluded then that if a law mandat-
ing a minimum sentence were found to be unconstitutional on the facts 
of a particular case (because the sentence imposed would itself infringe 
the Charter), the law should be struck down under section 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.32 In other words, absent a facial challenge to the 
statute, a court’s constitutional discretion can be bounded by the limits 
of a statutory minimum. That said, Ferguson makes a crucial distinc-
tion: the Court did note that section 24(1) could be used “as a remedy, 
not for unconstitutional laws, but for unconstitutional government acts 
committed under the authority of legal regimes which are accepted as 
fully constitutional”.33 That proposition has been confirmed in Na-
sogaluak. On the facts here, it was government acts, not the legal 
regime itself, that were impugned. Without pointing to Ferguson, the 
Court again left the door open to a “constitutional exemption”, but only 
in rare circumstances where there was a “particularly egregious form of 
misconduct”.34 What misconduct is sufficient to meet this high thresh-
old, however, remains unclear.  
                                                                                                             
30  Id., at para. 56. 
31  R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.). 
32  Id., at para. 74. 
33  Id., at para. 60 (emphasis added). 
34  Nasogaluak, supra, note 4, at para. 64 (“[I]n some exceptional cases, sentence reduction 
outside statutory limits, under s. 24(1) of the Charter, may be the sole effective remedy for some 
particularly egregious form of misconduct … In that case, the validity of the law would not be at 
stake, the sole concern being the specific conduct of those state agents.”). 
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(c) R. v. Conway 
Conway has greatly simplified the test for determining the jurisdic-
tion of administrative tribunals to grant Charter remedies. But, as this 
case itself shows, the broad jurisdiction conferred on tribunals in the 
abstract can become quite narrow when applied in practice. The promise 
of Conway may thus be more ephemeral than first apparent. The appel-
lant, Paul Conway, was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a 
charge of sexual assault with a weapon. Diagnosed with a litany of 
conditions, he has been detained for over two decades in Ontario’s 
mental health system. At his annual review hearing before the Ontario 
Review Board, Conway alleged breaches of sections 2(b), 2(d), 7, 8, 9, 
12 and 15(1). The Board concluded that Conway was a threat to public 
safety and ordered that he remain in treatment pursuant to the statutory 
scheme. It also concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider a section 
24(1) application.  
The Supreme Court dismissed Conway’s appeal, but only after clari-
fying several lines of jurisprudence and rearticulating the test for when 
administrative tribunals have remedial jurisdiction under section 24(1). 
Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, observed that Conway 
presented an opportunity to determine whether three “waves” of cases in 
this area could be “merged”.35 The jurisprudence of those cases sug-
gested two conclusions: First, “administrative tribunals with the power to 
decide questions of law, and from whom constitutional jurisdiction has 
not been clearly withdrawn, have the authority to resolve constitutional 
questions that are linked to matters properly before them.”36 Second, 
“they must act consistently with the Charter and its values when exercis-
ing their statutory functions.”37 
In light of the above conclusions, Abella J. crafted a simplified, two-
part inquiry:38 first, having regard to its statutory mandate, does the 
tribunal have the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies generally? The 
answer will depend on “whether the administrative tribunal has jurisdic-
tion, explicit or implied, to decide questions of law.”39 If it does, then it is 
prima facie a court of competent jurisdiction under section 24(1) “unless 
                                                                                                             
35  Conway, supra, note 4, at para. 7. 
36  Id., at para. 78. 
37  Id. 
38  Id., at para. 22. 
39  Id., at para. 81. 
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it is clearly demonstrated that the legislature intended to exclude the 
Charter from the tribunal’s jurisdiction”.40 Second, assuming the first 
threshold is met, can the tribunal grant the particular remedy sought 
based on its statutory mandate? The answer hinges on “discerning 
legislative intent”.41 The critical question “will always” be “whether the 
remedy sought is the kind of remedy that the legislature intended would 
fit within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal”.42 
On the facts in Conway, the key was the second step. Pursuant to its 
statutory scheme, the Board was entitled to make one of only three 
dispositions: an absolute discharge, a conditional discharge or a detention 
order. If the Board found that a patient is a significant threat to public 
safety, as was the case in Conway, an absolute discharge is statutorily 
unavailable.43 Conway argued that he was nevertheless entitled to an 
absolute discharge by virtue of the tribunal’s powers under section 24(1). 
But Abella J. disagreed, reasoning that “Parliament did not imbue the 
Board with free remedial rein” once it found a given patient was a threat 
to public safety.44 Restricting the Board’s power was Parliament’s 
prerogative and “barring a constitutional challenge to the legislation, no 
judicial fiat can overrule Parliament’s clear expression of intent.”45 Such 
reasoning confirms the Court’s growing confidence in the abilities of 
statutory remedies to meaningfully vindicate Charter rights — perhaps so 
much so that Conway did not recognize the “constitutional exemption” 
left open for rare cases found in Nasogaluak in the sentencing context. 
A potential wrinkle with the approach in Conway is that the reason-
ing appears to merge statutory remedies with Charter remedies. The 
Board could not grant an absolute discharge as a Charter remedy because 
it could not grant an absolute discharge as a statutory remedy. Looked at 
another way, if Conway had succeeded based on the statutory scheme 
(because he met its criteria for an absolute discharge), that would obviate 
the need for a Charter remedy; on the other hand, if he failed under the 
statutory criteria, the Charter remedy was nonetheless unavailable. In 
either scenario, the Charter seems irrelevant. If this result is patterned in 
subsequent cases, Conway may well render section 24(1) redundant in 
                                                                                                             
40  Id. 
41  Id., at para. 82. 
42  Id. 
43  Id., at para. 90. 
44  Id., at para. 97. 
45  Id. 
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the administrative tribunal context. It may be, however, that the promise 
of Conway lies not in cases where the statutory scheme is clear, but 
where there are gaps, which can then be filled by remedies under section 
24(1). Time will tell. 
(d)  Vancouver (City) v. Ward 
The sole question on appeal in Ward concerned when money dam-
ages may be awarded as a section 24(1) remedy. The answer appears to 
be a carefully hedged “it depends”. The facts here concerned a mistaken 
arrest, a strip search, a 4.5-hour long detainment, and the police seizure 
of a car. The claimant had no claims in tort available, but the trial judge 
found infringements of sections 8 and 9, notwithstanding the absence of 
any finding of bad faith by the police, and assessed damages under 
section 24(1), including a $5,000 award for arbitrary detainment, $5,000 
for the strip search, and $100 for the car seizure.46 Vancouver appealed 
the latter two awards only.  
Referencing the seminal Doucet-Boudreau analysis of the function of 
Charter remedies and drawing heavily on the decisions of foreign 
courts,47 the Chief Justice concluded that constitutional damages may be 
appropriate where they (1) serve to compensate the victim for psycho-
logical, physical and pecuniary losses, or harms to intangible interests;48 
(2) vindicate rights in the sense that they restore public confidence;49 and 
(3) deter future unconstitutional conduct by the state.50 “In most cases, all 
three objects will be present,” but a particular damage award need not 
fulfil all three functions.51 
Two factors, however, may restrict the availability of damages: first, 
the availability of other damages, as there should be no duplication 
                                                                                                             
46  Specifically, the trial judge found the strip search and the vehicle seizure violated the 
respondent’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8. In addition, the trial 
judge found that the police violated the respondent’s s. 9 rights and committed the tort of wrongful 
imprisonment by detaining him longer than necessary. 
47  Ward, supra, note 4, at para. 74. The Chief Justice referenced judgments of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, English Court of Appeals, New Zealand Supreme Court and South African 
Constitutional Court, for example, to support her conclusions that public law damages can serve to 
compensate, vindicate a right and deter further infringements. See discussion at paras. 25-29. 
48  Id., at para. 27. 
49  Id., at para. 28. 
50  Id., at para. 29. 
51  Id., at para. 30. 
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between private and public law damages;52 and second, concerns about 
good governance.53 The second factor will likely emerge as the critical 
one in future cases. The Chief Justice reasoned that good governance, a 
foundational principle of the Charter, would itself be damaged if the state 
shirked from enforcing a valid statute for fear of Charter damages. She 
cited the earlier case of Mackin for the principle that damages should not 
be awarded for state action pursuant to valid statute unless “clearly 
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power”.54 The state should be afforded 
“some immunity from liability in damages resulting from the conduct of 
certain functions that only the state can perform”.55 That concern may 
manifest itself in the future to certain section 24(1) “defences” which 
will become clearer “as the law in this area matures”.56 Different situa-
tions may call for different “thresholds”, as in the private law context.57 
For now, however, the Chief Justice concluded that these are “complex 
matters which have not been explored on this appeal”; she thus left “the 
exact parameters of future defences to future cases”.58 
On the facts of Ward, the Court concluded that the requisite threshold 
was a section 8 breach itself — and no more. The Chief Justice wrote 
that the respondent “had a constitutional right to be free from unreason-
able search and seizure, which was violated in an egregious fashion”.59 
Though there was no finding of bad faith, “[m]inimum sensitivity to 
Charter concerns within the context of the particular situation would 
have shown the [strip] search to be unnecessary and violative.”60 Accord-
ingly, that infringement called for compensation, but also engaged the 
objects of vindication and deterrence.61 The Court quickly dispensed with 
any countervailing factors in a single paragraph.62 With respect to the 
car’s seizure, however, the Court concluded that while it was “wrong, it 
was not of a serious nature”.63 The Court affirmed the $5,000 award for 
                                                                                                             
52  Id., at para. 35. 
53  Id., at para. 39. 
54  Id., at para. 39, citing Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 
13, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, at para. 78 (S.C.C.). 
55  Ward, supra, note 4, at para. 40. 
56  Id., at para. 43.  
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id., at para. 64. 
60  Id., at paras. 65, 72. 
61  Id., at para. 66. 
62  Id., at para. 68. 
63  Id., at para. 77. 
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the search, but set aside the $100 award for the car, substituting declara-
tory relief.64 
The differential treatment between the damages for the strip search 
and car’s seizure suggests that an analysis of the object of damages may 
take on aspects of a torts-like negligence determination. For example, 
with respect to the strip search, the Chief Justice noted that “it is not too 
much to expect that police would be familiar with the settled law” 
concerning when such searches are inappropriate.65 This ostensible 
negligence pointed to a need to deter future careless conduct.66 In 
contrast, the car’s seizure is portrayed as a mistake that was quickly 
corrected. Accordingly, the rationale for deterrence was not “compel-
ling”.67 Negligence, however, was not explicitly recognized as a factor 
worth considering in the Ward framework. Regardless, Ward is certain to 
spur additional litigation and such cases will be necessary to more clearly 
define the contours of the constitutional damages now available under 
section 24(1).  
2. Access to Information 
(a)  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada 
Torstar was the only case in 2010 where the Court engaged with the 
Oakes68 test and, in doing so, confirmed its adherence to the new 
approach the Chief Justice articulated a year earlier in Hutterian Breth-
ren.69 In particular, Torstar makes abundantly clear that, after decades of 
being relegated to the jurisprudential corner, the fourth and final stage of 
Oakes can be the decisive point in the Court’s section 1 analysis.  
In Torstar, a number of media organizations launched a facial chal-
lenge to section 517 of the Criminal Code on the basis that it violates 
section 2(b). The provision provides for a mandatory publication ban at 
the request of the accused, covering the evidence and representations made 
at a bail hearing and any reasons given for the order. The Court accepted 
                                                                                                             
64  Id., at para. 79. 
65  Id., at para. 65. 
66  Id., at para. 72. 
67  Id., at para. 77. 
68  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
69  Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37, 
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. 
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that there is “no question” that such an order limits expression.70 The only 
live issue was whether the mandatory ban was justified under section 1. 
As part of its Oakes analysis, the Court concluded that the law consti-
tuted a minimal impairment of rights, confirming the more deferential 
approach to minimal impairment expressed in Hutterian Brethren, namely 
that “the minimum impairment test requires only that the government 
choose the least drastic means of achieving its objective.”71 Under this 
approach, a measure restricting rights will only fail the minimal impair-
ment test if there is an alternative measure that can achieve the govern-
ment’s objective equally well, while being less rights restrictive. It is thus 
unsurprising that Torstar also became “a case where the decisive analysis 
falls to be done at the final stage of Oakes” — a result which will likely 
occur with increasing frequency.72 In this regard, after listing the various 
salutary and deleterious effects of the measure, Deschamps J. concluded 
that “[a]lthough not a perfect outcome, the mandatory ban represents a 
reasonable compromise.”73 Just as in Hutterian Brethren, the Court’s 
fourth-stage balancing in Torstar is notable for its remarkable brevity and 
considerable deference to Parliament.  
In her lone dissent, Abella J. disagreed with the majority’s analysis 
only with respect to the fourth prong of Oakes on the basis that “the 
salutary effects of the ban under s. 517 are not proportional to the 
harmful effects flowing from the infringement of the open court princi-
ple.”74 Her dissenting opinion in Hutterian Brethren, however, confirms 
this disagreement is not with the new approach to Oakes, but only with the 
outcome in this case (as it also was in the previous case). Indeed, Abella J. 
observed in Hutterian Brethren that “most of the heavy conceptual lifting 
and balancing ought to be done at the final step — proportionality” 
because “[p]roportionality [under the fourth stage of Oakes] is, after all, 
what s. 1 is about.”75 It seems safe thus to conclude that the Court is of one 
mind on at least this: the fourth stage of Oakes has arrived. 
                                                                                                             
70  Torstar, supra, note 4, at para. 2. 
71  Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 69, at para. 54 (emphasis in original). 
72  Id., at para. 78. Indeed, Deschamps J. in Torstar expressly pointed to the decision in 
Hutterian Brethren and its defence of the fourth stage of Oakes. Torstar, supra, note 4, at para. 50. 
73  Torstar, id., at para. 60. 
74  Id., at para. 77. 
75  Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 69, at para. 149. 
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(b)  Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.  
In CLA, a unanimous Court for the first time recognized a limited 
right to access government information under section 2(b) “where it is 
shown to be a necessary precondition of meaningful expression, does not 
encroach on protected privileges, and is compatible with the function of 
the institution concerned”.76 Though this right appears to be extremely 
narrow, its recognition nonetheless represents a noteworthy advance for 
section 2(b) jurisprudence. 
This Charter challenge began with the staying of a murder trial ow-
ing to “many instances of abusive conduct by state officials”.77 A 
subsequent provincial police investigation, however, exonerated local 
police of any misconduct. The Ontario Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 
concerned with the disparity between the trial judge’s and investigation’s 
findings, made a request under Ontario’s freedom of information statute 
for disclosure of the police investigation records. That law, however, 
exempts certain records from disclosure, subject to the relevant minis-
ter’s discretion, including law enforcement records (under section 14) 
and solicitor-client records (under section 19). Some of these exempt 
records — but not those under sections 14 and 19 — are subject to a 
further review to determine whether a compelling public interest in 
disclosure outweighs the basis for the initial exemption. Here, the 
minister exercised his discretion to decline disclosure — without 
explanation — claiming exemptions under sections 14 and 19. On 
review, the privacy commissioner agreed that the impugned records 
qualified for exemption under sections 14 and 19 and further held that 
the inapplicability of section 23’s public interest override to those 
sections did not infringe the CLA’s section 2(b) rights.  
The Chief Justice and Abella J., writing for the Court, began with the 
premise that “[s]ection 2(b) guarantees freedom of expression, not access 
to information.”78 That said, they recognized that “[a]ccess is a derivative 
right which may arise where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful 
expression on the functioning of government.”79 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the justices eschewed the positive versus negative rights debate that 
has crept into the section 2(b) jurisprudence as a result of the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
76  CLA, supra, note 4, at para. 5. 
77  Id., at para. 10 (emphasis removed). 
78  Id., at para. 30. 
79  Id.  
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recent decisions in Baier and Greater Vancouver.80 A finding that a 
claimant is asserting a positive expressive right can be fatal to his claim, 
as it was in Baier, because it has generally been understood that section 
2(b) “prohibits gags, but does not compel the distribution of mega-
phones”.81 In CLA, however, though the positive versus negative ques-
tion had occupied the lower courts, the Chief Justice and Abella J. 
concluded that “nothing would be gained by furthering this debate.”82 
Unfortunately, they offered no further comment, and so it remains 
unclear whether the Court is backtracking from its “platform” framework 
in Baier or if CLA stands on its own. 
Instead, the Court further adapted its long-standing framework from 
Irwin Toy/City of Montréal83 for the access context. Again, however, the 
Chief Justice and Abella J.’s opinion is notable more for its conclusions 
than its elucidation of the jurisprudential path taken to arrive there: 
To demonstrate that there is expressive content in accessing such 
documents, the claimant must establish that the denial of access 
effectively precludes meaningful commentary. If the claimant can show 
this, there is a prima facie case for the production of the documents in 
question. But even if this prima facie case is established, the claim may 
be defeated by factors that remove s. 2(b) protection, e.g. if the 
documents sought are protected by privilege or if production of the 
documents would interfere with the proper functioning of the 
governmental institution in question. If the claim survives this second 
step, then the claimant establishes that s. 2(b) is engaged. The only 
remaining question is whether the government action infringes that 
protection.84 
The terms “meaningful public discussion”, “meaningful commentary”, 
and equivalents are used no less than 10 times in the Court’s opinion,85 
yet no clear definition for what “meaningful” actually means is provided. 
                                                                                                             
80  Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Baier”]; Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of 
Students — British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, 2009 SCC 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Greater Vancouver”]. 
81  Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C. J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, at 
1035 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”]. 
82  CLA, supra, note 4, at para. 31. 
83  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]; Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, 
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City of Montreal”]. 
84  CLA, supra, note 4, at para. 33 (emphasis added). 
85  Id., at paras. 5, 30-31, 33, 36-37, 58-59. 
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Furthermore, the first of the test’s two prongs will be met only where 
access is “necessary” for such discussion, or if such discussion would be 
“substantially impeded”, “effectively preclud[ed]” or “cannot take place” 
without it.86 Though the diction here is clearer, there is arguably a 
material difference between something that is a necessary condition and 
something that is only a substantial impediment. 
As for the second stage, the Court recognized that privileges are “ap-
propriate derogations from the scope of the protection” afforded under 
section 2(b).87 Accordingly, common law privileges, including solicitor-
client privilege, “generally represent situations where the public interest 
in confidentiality outweighs the interests served by disclosure”.88 
Drawing on their reasoning in City of Montréal, the Court observed that 
the “historic function of a particular institution” may also preclude 
disclosure; it cited cabinet deliberations or judicial memoranda as 
examples.89  
The crux of the instant case, however, came down to a question of 
statutory interpretation. The Court concluded that adding the section 23 
public interest override to the law enforcement exemption under section 
14 or the solicitor-client exemption under section 19 “would add little to 
what is already provided for” in those sections.90 Crucially, the language 
of both those sections confers discretion on the minister by stipulating 
that public disclosure “may” be refused. That word was highly signifi-
cant: citing general administrative law principles, the Chief Justice and 
Abella J. concluded the discretion meant that “the [minister] must weigh 
the considerations for and against disclosure, including the public interest 
in disclosure.”91  
Returning to the constitutional question, the Chief Justice and Abella 
J. concluded that there would only be a section 2(b) infringement on the 
facts here if, absent a section 23 override, the existing statutory scheme 
impeded meaningful discussion of any police misconduct. They con-
cluded this was not the case for three reasons. First, as “much is known 
                                                                                                             
86  Id., at paras. 33, 37-38, 58-59. 
87  Id., at para. 39. 
88  Id. 
89  Id., at para. 40. 
90  Id., at para. 43. The Court did not say, but seems implicitly to have presumed, that had  
ss. 14 and 19 been subject to s. 23, there would be no constitutional question whatsoever. This 
situation is likely a result of the way the CLA pleaded its case on appeal. 
91  Id., at para. 46. 
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about those events”, the CLA could not show necessity.92 Second, even if 
it could show necessity, disclosure would likely impinge “on privileges 
or impair the proper functioning of relevant government institutions”.93 
Third and finally, the impact of section 23 on the consideration already 
built into sections 14 and 19 “is so minimal that even if s. 2(b) were 
engaged, it would not be breached”.94  
The recognition of a limited constitutional right of access to informa-
tion is a significant step in the Court’s section 2(b) jurisprudence, but 
CLA leaves many questions about the scope of that right. In addition to 
the problems already noted, the Court appears to conceive of “meaning-
ful public discussion” at a high level of generality. Surely there can be 
little doubt that there can be no discussion on the specific issues raised in 
the reports sought by the CLA, since the public does not know what is in 
them. Nonetheless, the Court found that that meaningful public discus-
sion is not precluded by keeping those materials out of the public 
domain. Furthermore, the “proper functioning of government” test in the 
access context remains largely undefined and has the potential to be quite 
broad. Additional cases will be necessary to elucidate the breadth of that 
allowance.  
3. Journalist Source Privilege 
(a)  R. v. National Post; Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General) 
The flip side of the access debate is whether the Charter protects 
whistleblowers. In two separate cases last year, the Court was presented 
with the question of whether journalists enjoy a constitutional right to 
protect the identity of such sources. Though a unanimous Court answered 
in the negative in both cases, it nonetheless recognized potentially 
rigorous protection for journalists and their sources at common law, as 
rejuvenated by Charter values. 
In National Post, the police sought materials — an envelope and the 
enclosed document — from a reporter that they said constituted evidence 
of a fraud. The reporter had received those documents while reporting on 
the “Shawinigate” scandal that engulfed former Prime Minister Jean 
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Chrétien in the late 1990s. The documents, it was alleged, were forgeries, 
as the reporter discovered once he attempted to authenticate them. The 
police sought the documents in order to find the alleged fraudster. The 
reporter, who believed his source had not intended to deceive him but 
was himself deceived by some third person, refused to hand over the 
materials lest they identify his source.  
Justice Binnie, writing for eight justices, accepted the importance of 
confidential sources,95 but flatly rejected any contention that news-
gathering itself was a Charter-protected right. Such a view, Binnie J. 
reasoned, was built on the incorrect premise that journalist-source 
privilege should be treated “as if it were an enumerated Charter right or 
freedom”.96 Though he recognized that the right to gather news, while 
not mentioned in the text of section 2(b), is surely implicit in any right to 
freedom of the press, Binnie J. was at pains not to recognize any particu-
lar form of newsgathering as “entrenched in the Constitution”.97 In his 
assessment, such a view would lend credence to the idea of constitution-
alizing “[c]hequebook journalism,” “long-range microphones”, and 
“telephoto lenses”.98  
The reluctance to draw distinctions between different kinds of news-
gathering affected the Court’s decision in a second way. In last year’s 
Grant v. Torstar, the Court extended the British defence of “responsible 
journalism” to the broader concept of “responsible communication”, 
covering not only the traditional media, but bloggers and other online 
media outlets as well.99 Crucially, in Grant, the Court was willing to be 
over-inclusive in its protective umbrella, even though it recognized “the 
essence” of the defence concerned traditional journalists.100 In National 
Post, however, the very breadth of the class protected by Grant may well 
have undermined the prospect of any constitutional protection for 
traditional journalists. Pointing to Grant, Binnie J. remarked that “[t]o 
throw a constitutional immunity around the interactions of such a 
heterogeneous and ill-defined group of writers and speakers and which-
ever ‘sources’ they deem worthy of a promise of confidentiality … would 
                                                                                                             
95  National Post, supra, note 4, at para. 28. 
96  Id., at para. 38. 
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98  Id. 
99  Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at 
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blow a giant hole in law enforcement and other constitutionally recog-
nized values such as privacy.”101 Without questioning the choice to 
define the protected group broadly in Grant, one is nonetheless left to 
wonder whether the argument for a constitutionally protected privilege 
might have fared better in National Post had the Court limited Grant to 
traditional journalists. Based on concerns of over-inclusiveness, the 
Court ultimately rejected a common law class-privilege model in 
National Post.102 
Instead, Binnie J. concluded a case-by-case approach, based on the 
well-known Wigmore criteria for establishing confidentiality at common 
law but “informed by the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression 
and the rights of the press and other media of communication”.103 The 
Court focused principally on the last two of the four Wigmore criteria.104 
The third, which speaks to whether the relationship must be “sedulously 
fostered”, “introduces some flexibility” in a court’s evaluation of 
different sources and journalists.105 This prong addresses the over-
inclusiveness concern: The relationship between a blogger and his 
confidential source “might be weighed differently” than one between a 
professional journalist and her source.106 The fourth prong, however, 
“does most of the work,” because it seeks to “achieve proportionality in 
striking a balance among the competing interests”.107 In other words, a 
court must weigh the benefits of the disclosure, including “the nature and 
seriousness of the offence under investigation, and the probative value of 
the evidence sought to be obtained”, on the one hand, with “the public 
interest in respecting the journalist’s promise of confidentiality”, on the 
other.108 Crucially, the onus remains on the party seeking to assert the 
privilege throughout.109 
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On the facts of National Post, given that the reporter in question was 
a professional journalist, the decisive analysis fell to the fourth stage of 
the Wigmore test. Here, Binnie J. stressed the “real possibility of obtain-
ing DNA evidence” concerning “the very actus reus … of the alleged 
crime”.110 That combination was sufficient for the majority to order 
disclosure of the documents.111 Justice Abella, writing in dissent, agreed 
with the majority’s analysis of the first three stages of the Wigmore test, 
but parted company at the crucial fourth stage. In her view, the evidence 
was of “only questionable assistance in connection with a crime of 
moderate seriousness”.112 
The Court’s decision in Globe and Mail, handed down some seven 
months later, may underscore that the result in National Post hinged on 
the fact that the first case involved a crime and, more specifically, that 
the disclosure related to the actus reus of the crime.113 In Globe and 
Mail, the Court was concerned with civil litigation flowing from the 
Quebec sponsorship scandal of the 1990s. The issue was whether a trial 
judge could order a reporter for The Globe and Mail newspaper to reveal 
the identity of a source who had been providing details of confidential 
settlement negotiations between the federal Attorney General and a 
company involved in the scandal. Holding that a Wigmore-like analysis 
was equally applicable in the context of the Quebec civil code, LeBel J. 
concluded for a unanimous Court that the journalist-source privilege 
claim here must be “rigorously tested against the Wigmore criteria”.114 
Though actual determination was remanded to the trial court, LeBel J. 
made clear that, given the “high societal interest in investigative journal-
ism”, the reporter could “only be compelled to speak if his response was 
vital to the integrity of the administration of justice”.115 
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4. The Right to Counsel 
(a)  R. v. Sinclair 
In the Sinclair trilogy,116 a sharply divided Court held the line on the 
scope of section 10(b), concluding that the Charter “does not mandate the 
presence of defence counsel throughout a custodial interrogation”.117 
Rather, a five-justice majority in Sinclair held that “the right to counsel is 
essentially a one-time matter with few recognized exceptions.”118 The 
Court split essentially along the same lines as it had in Singh,119 the last 
case to interpret section 10(b), with Cromwell J. replacing the now-
retired Bastarache J. in the majority.120 Each of the three cases generated 
three opinions, with each opinion offering a different test for determining 
when counsel must be present. Notably, however, each opinion either 
rejected or declined to decide whether Canada should adopt the Ameri-
can approach in Miranda v. Arizona,121 under which the accused has a 
right to have counsel present throughout an interrogation. 
In the trilogy’s lead case, the appellant, after being arrested for mur-
der, was twice advised by police that he had a right to instruct counsel 
and he twice spoke to a lawyer. Each conversation lasted three minutes 
or less, but he told police he was satisfied with the calls. In response to 
increasingly tough questioning during a five-hour interrogation, the 
accused alternated between repeating his desire to speak with his lawyer 
and his intention to remain silent. In time, however, when confronted 
with evidence of his guilt, he confessed. 
At the Court, the disagreement between the justices turned in part on 
the text of section 10(b), which provides that a person has the right to 
                                                                                                             
116  See also McCrimmon, supra, note 4, and Willier, supra, note 4. 
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“retain and instruct counsel without delay”. The Chief Justice and 
Charron J., writing for the majority, acknowledged that though the 
language “makes clear that the right arises on detention, there is nothing 
on its face to indicate when the right is exhausted”.122 Turning to “a 
deeper purposive analysis”,123 the majority concluded that section 10(b) 
exists to provide an opportunity to obtain legal advice as to his rights, 
“chief” among them in the context of a custodial interrogation being the 
right under section 7 to choose whether or not to cooperate.124 Under the 
majority’s approach, further consultation with counsel is required when 
“changed circumstances suggest that reconsultation is necessary in order 
for the detainee to have the information relevant to choosing whether to 
cooperate with the police investigation or not.”125 Such circumstances 
would include the use of non-routine procedures, such as a line-up or 
polygraphs;126 a change in jeopardy when an investigation takes a new 
turn;127 and belief that the detainee may not have understood his right to 
counsel.128 
In dissent, LeBel and Fish JJ. offered severe criticism of the major-
ity’s approach, saying that it “carries significant and unacceptable 
consequences for the administration of criminal justice and the constitu-
tional rights of detainees in this country”.129 They disputed the majority’s 
characterization of the plain meaning of section 10(b) which, they 
concluded (relying heavily on the French text), affords a detainee a 
“prospective right to the assistance of counsel”.130 The purpose of such a 
right, to them, is clear: at a time when a detainee is “particularly vulner-
able”, the right to counsel serves not only to remind the detainee of his or 
her rights, but also to “explain why and how that right should be, and can 
be, effectively exercised”.131 Accordingly, LeBel and Fish JJ. concluded 
that a detainee is entitled to speak with counsel upon request, without the 
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need to establish that the request is objectively valid or reasonable.132 
(Notably, though, the two justices were non-committal on Miranda.133)  
In the third and final opinion, Binnie J., speaking only for himself in 
a forceful dissenting opinion, sought to find a middle ground between the 
two divided camps. It is clear where his focus lies: Though he acknowl-
edged that many confessions obtained by police are true, “too many are 
not.”134 In contrast to the majority’s focus on “changed” circumstances, 
Binnie J. instead devised a test to address “evolving” circumstances of an 
interrogation “that were not — and could not be — anticipated at the 
outset during the initial consultation with counsel”.135 In his view, if the 
right to counsel is to be given its “full effect”, it must mean more than an 
incantation from counsel to “keep your mouth shut”.136 A “one size fits 
all” instruction to keep quiet no matter what occurs in an interrogation 
“may turn out to be terrible advice” if, for example, the detainee has an 
alibi.137 Accordingly, Binnie J. would permit re-consultation with counsel 
when a detainee’s request is reasonable. The request must find support in 
objective factors including, for example, the extent of prior contact with 
counsel, the length of the interview at the time of the request, and the 
extent of information (true or false) provided by police prior to the 
request.138 On the facts in Sinclair, Binnie J. concluded the detainee’s 
request was reasonable in light of the police’s statements to the detainee 
that they had “absolutely overwhelming” evidence against him.139 The 
majority, however, criticized Binnie J.’s approach on the twin bases that 
it “would go further and expand the category of cases” where counsel’s 
presence is required and that his proposed test is “so vague that it  
is impractical”.140  
                                                                                                             
132  Id., at para. 172. 
133  Id., at para. 201 (“[W]e take care to make perfectly clear that we are not advocating 
the adoption of the American rules under Miranda. … And while the appellant did urge us to find 
that counsel are entitled to be present during custodial interrogations, there is no need for us to  
do so …”). 
134  Id., at para. 78; see also para. 90. 
135  Id., at para. 83. 
136  Id., at paras. 86, 91. 
137  Id., at para. 104. 
138  Id., at para. 106. 
139  Id., at para. 116. 
140  Id., at paras. 56, 59. 
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5. Search and Seizure 
Four of the five section 8 cases in 2010 concerned police tactics in 
the course of drug investigations. Notably, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the police conduct in each of those four cases, suggesting that 
it is not only the executive branch that is prepared to get tough in the war 
on drugs. None of the five section 8 cases makes new law, which is 
perhaps explained by the fact that each of the five cases reached the 
Court as of right.  
(a)  R. v. Gomboc 
Though only two of nine justices dissented from the Court’s holding 
in Gomboc, the most significant of the five section 8 decisions handed 
down in 2010, the case has no majority opinion. The seven justices who 
agreed on the holding — that there was no section 8 infringement — 
were split between a plurality opinion, authored by Deschamps J. and 
joined by three other justices,141 and a separate concurring opinion, 
authored by Abella J. and joined by two other justices.142 This division is 
unfortunate because both the plurality and concurring opinions reflect 
interesting evolutions in the thinking of the justices on privacy rights 
under section 8, the future application of which appears uncertain. 
The central issue in the case was whether the accused had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the information disclosed by a digital 
recording ammeter (“DRA”). The device, which was installed outside the 
accused’s property, disclosed patterns of electricity use. The resulting 
data showed a pattern of cycling, which was consistent with the existence 
of a marijuana grow operation. Based on that data and other information, 
a search warrant was obtained and over 150 kilograms of bulk marijuana 
were found in the home. 
All the justices took their cue from the two-part analysis in 
Tessling:143 whether the accused had a subjective expectation of privacy 
and whether that expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.144 
The split in Gomboc concerned the latter element, with its inherent 
                                                                                                             
141  Justices Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell. 
142  Justices Binnie and LeBel. 
143  R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 SCC 67 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Tessling”]. 
144  Gomboc, supra, note 4, at paras. 18, 78, 107. 
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normative judgment. Two lines of inquiry have assisted in that determi-
nation in previous cases. First, in Plant, the Court concluded that section 
8 protects “a biographical core of personal information” that “would 
include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle 
and personal choices of the individual”.145 Second, in Tessling, the Court 
drew a distinction between three realms of privacy — personal, territorial 
and informational — and suggested a hierarchy between them.146 Both 
inquiries would further divide the Court in Gomboc. 
Justice Deschamps, for the plurality, stressed that the DRA data “re-
veals nothing but one particular piece of information: the consumption of 
electricity”.147 That disclosure “does not yield anything meaningful in 
terms of biographical core data that attracts constitutional protection”.148 
She cited several examples of information that might go to that core — 
whether particular persons were watching TV or what their political 
affiliation was — and noted that none of them were present here.149 
Justice Abella disputed this characterization because the presence of a 
marijuana grow operation “is presumptively information about which 
individuals are entitled to expect privacy because it is information about 
an activity inside the home”.150 The Chief Justice and Fish J., writing in 
dissent, agreed with Abella J. and added that “[e]vidence of criminal 
activity … has previously been considered by this Court to be very 
personal biographical information.”151 Though the view of Deschamps J. 
appears more faithful to the original conception of the biographical core 
— centred on the “intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of 
the individual” — the weight of precedent appears to be on the side of a 
                                                                                                             
145  R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at 293 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
146  Tessling, supra, note 143, at paras. 20-24. 
147  Gomboc, supra, note 4, at para. 14. 
148  Id., at para. 43. 
149  The information not disclosed included how many occupants live in the residence, 
whether any occupants are home at a particular time, whether anyone is watching television, whether 
anyone is taking a bath, sitting in a hot tub, or showering, the gender of the occupants, the political 
affiliation of the occupants, the sexual orientation of the occupants, and where electricity is being 
used in the house. Id., at para. 7. 
150  Id., at para. 80 (emphasis in original). 
151  Id., at para. 130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, as if to emphasize their 
point, the Chief Justice and Fish J. cited the dissenting opinion of Deschamps J. in Kang-Brown, one 
of the 2008 sniffer-dog cases, for that proposition. In Kang-Brown, Deschamps J. noted that 
evidence that an accused had come into contact with a controlled substance was “very personal” 
information. See R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at 
para. 175 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”]. 
28 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
more expansive conception.152 Indeed, from the Court’s recent jurispru-
dence, it is hard to discern what is not within the biographical core. Had 
her opinion commanded a majority, Deschamps J.’s opinion would have 
signalled a marked departure. 
With respect to the realms of privacy, Deschamps J. recognized that 
both informational and territorial privacy were implicated on these 
facts.153 Crucially, her opinion offers the Court’s first attempt at reconcil-
ing the hierarchies of these two realms, which can often overlap. Though 
in agreement with Tessling and Patrick154 that “the home is where our 
most intimate and personal activities often take place,”155 Deschamps J. 
cautioned that “[t]he Constitution does not cloak the home in an impene-
trable veil of privacy.”156 On the facts of Gomboc, she concluded that 
“the home itself was never directly the object of a search,” and, as a 
result, “the informational privacy interest should be the focal point of the 
analysis.”157 This is an interesting attempt to clarify the principles laid 
down in Tessling, though the distinction Deschamps J. draws between 
direct and indirect searches in this context is unclear. Though the other 
opinions did not grapple with the proposition, it would seem safe to say 
that none of the authors accept it.158 
Her disagreements with Deschamps J. in respect of the above not-
withstanding, Abella J. concurred that there had been no Charter in-
fringement. She reached that conclusion by looking at the regulation 
governing the privacy of utility customer information. The regulation 
allows a customer to request that his data remain confidential, in which 
case they could not be provided to police. Here, however, the accused had 
made no such request. For Abella J., the absence of such a request “deter-
minatively diminished the objective reasonableness of the customer’s 
                                                                                                             
152  See, e.g., Kang-Brown, id., R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 
S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M.(A.)”]; and R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, 2009 SCC 17, 
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (S.C.C.). 
153  Gomboc, supra, note 4, at para. 22. 
154  Supra, note 152.  
155  Gomboc, supra, note 4, at para. 45. 
156  Id., at para. 46. 
157  Id., at paras. 48-49. 
158  See id., at paras. 79-80 (Abella J., concurring) (“The existence of such activity, in my 
view, is presumptively information about which individuals are entitled to expect privacy because it 
is information about an activity inside the home”: at para. 80) (emphasis in original); at para. 124 
(McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., dissenting) (“The large-scale growing of plants within one’s home is 
a private activity, and a surveillance technique capable of making strong predictions regarding its 
existence is an intrusion on the occupant’s privacy …”) (emphasis added). 
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expectation of privacy in this case and, accordingly, the strength of his  
s. 8 claim”.159 
Both the plurality and concurring opinions are also notable for not 
requiring any threshold grounds for the use of DRA technology. Though 
Deschamps J. recognized that the devices are usually used at “the 
culminating point of the investigation”, after other data has been gath-
ered and perhaps even when reasonable and probable grounds for a 
warrant already exist, she did not actually require that such preconditions 
exist.160 To require reasonable and probable grounds for the use of the 
DRA, of course, would mean that the devices “can only be used where 
there is no need for them”.161 But, as the Court recognized in the 2008 
sniffer-dog cases, an “all-or-nothing” approach to novel search methods 
runs the risk of “totally eliminat[ing] significant invasions of privacy 
from any [Charter] protection because they are not akin to traditional 
searches”.162 For that reason, the Court adopted an intermediate standard 
of “reasonable suspicion” as a requirement before sniffer dogs could be 
constitutionally used. One is left to wonder why the standard could not 
have been considered here as a threshold protection, especially when the 
facts suggested it would have imposed no additional burden on the 
police.163  
III. FEDERALISM CASES 
Each of the Court’s five federalism cases in 2010 resulted in multiple 
opinions, even where the Court was unanimous in its holding. The cases 
evidence two small camps of justices, each with their own firmly held 
jurisprudential view preventing them from signing on to an opinion of 
the other, along with a larger group of justices who alternate between the 
two camps. If one is keeping a federalism scorecard, 2010 was a draw: 
                                                                                                             
159  Id., at para. 58. 
160  Id., at paras. 10-12. 
161  M. (A.), supra, note 152, at para. 9. 
162  Id., at paras. 53-54. 
163  The Chief Justice and Fish J. were the only justices to explicitly grapple with the police 
powers question. They noted that “[t]his is not a case like Kang-Brown” because “a police ‘stop-and-
search,’ by virtue of its exigent nature, provides a more compelling reason for expanding common 
law police powers than a situation like the present where a warrant can be obtained in a timely 
fashion with appropriate grounds.” Accordingly, they declined to find that a DRA-search was 
authorized by law. Gomboc, supra, note 4, at paras. 145-149. 
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the federal position won in two cases, the provincial position in two 
cases, and neither side is likely pleased with the result in the last case. 
1. Interjurisdictional Immunity 
(a)  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe; Quebec (Attorney General) 
v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn. 
The decisions in Lacombe and COPA, each of which “pits the local 
interest in land use planning against the national interest in a unified 
system of aeronautical navigation”,164 included two of the sharpest 
dissents at the Court last year. In both cases, Deschamps J., who enjoyed 
some support from just one other justice, reached a conclusion that was, 
in her own words, “diametrically opposed” to that of the Chief Justice 
and the rest of the Court.165 The majority’s approach, she concluded, was 
“antithetical to co-operation between the levels of government”.166 This 
theme — one side charging that the other lacks fidelity to the principles 
underlying Confederation — appears in each of the three sets of federal-
ism cases decided in 2010. 
Coming just three years after the Court signalled a strong preference 
in Western Bank167 for scaling back the scope of interjurisdictional 
immunity on the basis that it went against the “dominant tide” of recent 
jurisprudence, Lacombe and COPA together form a kind of seawall. The 
two cases make clear that interjurisdictional immunity is alive and well, 
at least in the limited context of the federal aeronautics power. They also 
provide some guidance on the previously unanswered question of what 
amounts to an “impairment” for purposes of interjurisdictional immunity. 
Notably, Deschamps J., one of the Court’s more forceful voices on 
                                                                                                             
164  COPA, supra, note 5, at para. 2. 
165  Lacombe, supra, note 5, at para. 182. In both Lacombe and COPA, the Chief Justice’s 
opinions for the majority were joined by all the justices save for LeBel and Deschamps JJ. Justice 
Deschamps dissented in both cases. Although LeBel J. concurred in judgment in Lacombe (on the 
basis that there was an operational conflict triggering federal paramountcy), he wrote separately to 
note his general agreement with the approach of Deschamps J. with respect to the pith and substance 
of the impugned municipal law and interjurisdictional immunity. In COPA, he concurred with 
Deschamps J. 
166  Lacombe, id., at para. 116. 
167  Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Western Bank”].  
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federalism, was not on the seven-judge panel in Western Bank.168 The 
implications of that case are at the core of the disagreements in Lacombe 
and COPA. 
The facts of both cases began with the establishment of an aero-
drome — on a lake in Lacombe and on an erstwhile woodlot in COPA. In 
Lacombe, the owners of summer homes located on the lake succeeded in 
lobbying their municipal government to pass a zoning by-law outlawing 
the aerodrome. In COPA, two individuals cleared a woodlot on their 
property, in violation of a provincial law designating the area as an 
agricultural region, to construct an airstrip. At the Supreme Court, the 
Chief Justice, writing for a majority of seven justices, found the munici-
pal by-law in Lacombe to be ultra vires. In COPA, though the provincial 
legislation was valid, it was inapplicable by virtue of interjurisdictional 
immunity.  
The central dispute between the Chief Justice and Deschamps J. re-
lated to the proper application of interjurisdictional immunity. Writing in 
COPA, the Chief Justice began her analysis pointing to a long line of 
precedent, dating back over 50 years, that has “repeatedly and consis-
tently held that the location of aerodromes lies within the core of the 
federal aeronautics power”.169 Crucially, it did not matter that Parliament, 
on the facts in both these cases, had not actually chosen to exercise that 
power by enacting a positive requirement with respect to location. (The 
federal legislation in this case was broadly permissive and did not require 
prior federal authorization for the location of rural aerodromes.170 As 
LeBel J. observed at the Lacombe hearing, the law essentially permitted 
anyone to construct an aerodrome “anywhere, anytime”.) Citing Western 
Bank, the Chief Justice concluded that the question was whether the 
provincial legislation “impairs” the federal power, as opposed to the old 
standards of “affects” (a lower threshold) or “sterilizes” (a higher 
threshold). To impair a federal power, the provincial incursion “not only 
affects the core federal power, but does so in a way that seriously or 
                                                                                                             
168  Justice Rothstein, who joined the majority in Lacombe and COPA, was the other justice 
who did not participate in Western Bank. There were two opinions in Western Bank: one for the 
majority by Binnie and LeBel JJ. and a concurring opinion by Bastarache J., who wrote only for 
himself. Justice Cromwell, who replaced Bastarache J. upon his retirement, joined the majority in 
both Lacombe and COPA. See Western Bank, id. 
169  COPA, supra, note 5, at para. 37. 
170  Lacombe, supra, note 5, at para. 16; COPA, id., at para. 12. 
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significantly trammels the federal power … It need not paralyze it, but it 
must be serious”.171 
On this basis, the Chief Justice concluded that the provincial legisla-
tion did impair the federal aeronautics power because it “prohibits the 
building of aerodromes in designated agricultural regions unless prior 
authorization has been obtained from the [provincial] Commission”.172 
This undermined the broadly permissive federal regime: “If Parliament 
wished to override [the provincial legislation] by way of federal para-
mountcy, it would be forced to establish a legislative conflict with each 
of the Commission’s decisions regarding aerodromes …”173 Such 
competing systems of regulation “would be a source of uncertainty and 
endless disputes” leading to “jurisdictional nightmare”.174 
Though Deschamps J. did not dispute that the core of the federal 
aeronautics power includes the location of aerodromes,175 she saw the 
Chief Justice’s reasoning as undermining the concept of “impairment” 
articulated in Western Bank. An impairment analysis, in her view, “must 
necessarily relate to the concrete effects of the measure in question”,176 
because a focus on impact on the federal head of power “leads to 
confusion between the issue of validity and that of applicability”.177 
(Under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, an otherwise valid 
law is held to be inapplicable where it impairs a core power of the other 
level of government.) By focusing on impairment of the federal power 
instead of “analysing the real effects of the zoning by-law on activities of 
federal undertakings … the Chief Justice effectively eliminates the 
impairment test”, leaving it “superfluous”.178 
                                                                                                             
171  COPA, id., at para. 45. 
172  Id., at para. 47. On this point, the Chief Justice and Deschamps J.’s interpretation of the 
same fact is diametrically opposed. With respect to the area designated by provincial regulation as an 
agricultural zone, the Chief Justice concludes (at para. 48): “It effectively removes 63,000 km2 … 
from the territory that Parliament has designated for aeronautical uses. This is not an insignificant 
amount of land, and much of it is strategically located.” (Emphasis added) Justice Deschamps, 
meanwhile, concludes (at para. 89): “The record shows that the designated agricultural land 
represents only about 63,000 km2, or about 4 percent of the province’s territory.” (Emphasis added) 
173  Id., at para. 53. 
174  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
175  Lacombe, supra, note 5, at para. 154. 
176  Id., at para. 115 (emphasis added). 
177  Id. 
178  Id., at para. 158 (emphasis in original). Though the Chief Justice does not directly re-
spond to this critique, it seems reasonable to infer, based on other comments, that she would 
conclude that Deschamps J. is mingling elements of paramountcy and interjurisdictional immunity: 
“Unlike interjurisdictional immunity, which is concerned with the scope of the federal power, 
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The background to this whole discussion, of course, is that while the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is in theory reciprocal, in 
practice, as Binnie and LeBel JJ. observed in Western Bank, “the doctrine 
has produced somewhat asymmetrical results.”179 This point was cer-
tainly not lost on Deschamps J., who noted that “the doctrine has been 
applied unequally, for the federal government’s benefit and therefore at 
the expense of the federate entities, the provinces …”180 Western Bank 
itself was less than helpful in defining what constitutes an impairment, 
thus foreshadowing the problem that arose in Lacombe and COPA. In 
that case, Binnie and LeBel JJ., speaking for the majority in that case, 
noted only that “[t]he difference between ‘affects’ and ‘impairs’ is that 
the former does not imply any adverse consequence whereas the latter 
does.”181  
At bottom, the conflict between the two camps concerns how much 
room is left for interjurisdictional immunity in an era of cooperative 
federalism. As the Chief Justice noted: 
The Province’s real objection appears to be that a law which presents a 
double aspect, and which is valid in its provincial aspect, should not 
have its application cut down merely because it impairs the core of a 
federal competence. Why, the Province asks, should a valid provincial 
law not apply, simply because Parliament has duplicative authority 
under the Constitution Act, 1867? If Parliament wants to prevent the 
impact, let it enact positive legislation creating an operative conflict 
and rely on the doctrine of federal paramountcy.182 
This line of reasoning, however, “misapprehends the doctrine of inter-
jurisdictional immunity” because it fails to appreciate that “it serves to 
protect the immunized core of federal power from any provincial 
impairment.”183 Put differently, the argument is “a challenge to the very 
existence of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity”.184 
 
                                                                                                             
paramountcy deals with the way in which that power is exercised”: COPA, supra, note 5, at para. 62 
(emphasis in original). 
179  Western Bank, supra, note 167, at para. 35 (internal quotation marks removed). 
180  Lacombe, supra, note 5, at para. 110. 
181  Western Bank, supra, note 167, at para. 48 (emphasis added). 
182  COPA, supra, note 5, at para. 56. 
183  Id., at para. 57 (emphasis added). 
184  Id., at para. 58. 
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It is clear that Deschamps J.’s understanding of “impairment” entails 
a higher threshold, which would thus provide greater room for provincial 
legislation via the double aspect doctrine, tempered by paramountcy. 
Interestingly, however, in COPA, both sides were in agreement that, had 
the analysis proceeded on the basis of a double aspect, there was no basis 
to invoke paramountcy: neither side found an operational conflict or a 
frustration of federal purpose.185 Indeed, the Chief Justice noted that the 
federal legislative scheme does not disclose “any federal purpose with 
respect to the location of aerodromes”.186 That concession was clearly 
frustrating for Deschamps J., who noted that “[t]here is something 
fundamentally incoherent in the interpretation of the rules of our federal-
ist system if a municipality is unable to establish reasonable limits to 
ensure that uses of its territory are compatible with one another where … 
there is no inconsistency with federal legislation.”187 
Though Western Bank can still be understood as discouraging expan-
sion of interjurisdictional immunity into new spheres, taking account of 
the majority view in Lacombe and COPA, it is clear that interjurisdic-
tional immunity “has not been removed from the federalism analysis”.188 
Indeed, in situations like this one, where there is a long line of precedent 
applying the doctrine in a particular context, a majority of justices on the 
McLachlin Court will not entertain revisiting its applicability in favour of 
a transition to the double aspect doctrine and federal paramountcy. “In 
this way”, the Chief Justice noted, “[the Court] balances the need for 
intergovernmental flexibility with the need for predictable results in areas 
of core federal authority.”189 
                                                                                                             
185  For the reasons of Deschamps J., see Lacombe, supra, note 5, at paras. 120-129, 169-181; 
for the Chief Justice’s, see COPA, id., at paras. 64-74. Justice LeBel, however, found an operational 
conflict in Lacombe and accordingly invoked federal paramountcy: Lacombe, at para. 70. 
186  COPA, id., at para. 74. 
187  Lacombe, supra, note 5, at para. 185. 
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2. Aboriginal Affairs and Labour Relations 
(a)  NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government 
and Service Employees’ Union; Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union v. Native Child and Family Services of Toronto 
Both of these cases pick up where Consolidated Fastfrate190 left off a 
year earlier, with the Court dividing along identical lines (even though all 
the justices concurred in judgment). The facts in both cases were quite 
simple: British Columbia and Ontario each established specialized, 
“culturally appropriate” and “culture-based” child welfare agencies for 
Aboriginal children.191 In each case, the federal government collaborated 
in some form in getting the agency off the ground. Both cases began their 
path to the Supreme Court when unions sought certification to represent 
employees.  
Justice Abella, writing for a majority of the Court in NIL/TU,O (pro-
nounced “NEEL-twa”), observed that “[f]or the last 85 years, this Court 
has consistently endorsed and applied a distinct legal test for determining 
the jurisdiction of labour relations on federalism grounds.”192 That test 
has been grounded in a presumption that “labour relations are presump-
tively a provincial matter, and that the federal government has jurisdic-
tion over labour relations only by way of exception.”193 The concurring 
opinion, authored by the Chief Justice and Fish J., did not disagree with 
any of this.194 The two camps did, however, disagree on the precise 
articulation of that test. At the risk of oversimplifying, the dispute comes 
down to four paragraphs authored by Beetz J. some 30 years ago in Four 
B.195 According to Abella J., Four B makes clear that the appropriate test 
in the labour relations context entails two distinct inquiries. First, a 
“functional test” must “examine the nature, operations and habitual 
activities of the entity to see if it is a federal undertaking”.196 If so, then 
the entity will be federally regulated. If the first step is inconclusive, 
                                                                                                             
190  Consolidated Fastfrate v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters, [2009] S.C.J. No. 53, 
2009 SCC 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.). 
191  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 5, at para. 5; Native Child, supra, note 5, at para. 4. 
192  NIL/TU,O, id., at para. 3. 
193  Id., at para. 11. 
194  Id., at para. 51. 
195  Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1979] S.C.J. No. 
138, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Four B”]. 
196  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 5, at para. 18. 
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however, the Court must proceed to the second step: would provincial 
regulation of the entity’s labour relations “impair the core of the federal 
head of power at issue”?197 If so, then the entity will be federally regu-
lated. The Chief Justice, however, sees a one-part “functional test” that 
integrates both questions asked by the majority: Does the undertaking at 
issue, viewed functionally in terms of its normal and habitual activities, 
fall within the core of a federal head of power?198  
Fidelity to precedent aside, both camps disagreed about the merits of 
a two- versus one-part test. Justice Abella cautioned that collapsing the 
two steps into a single inquiry “transforms the traditional labour relations 
test into a different test: the one used for determining whether a statute is 
‘inapplicable’ under the traditional interjurisdictional immunity doc-
trine”.199 The two-step inquiry, however, “preserves the integrity of the 
unique labour relations test”.200 One can perhaps infer that such a 
collapse, at least according to Abella J., would have the effect of locating 
an impairment of a federal power more often, especially under the test 
sanctioned in Lacombe and COPA. She stressed that “[t]he difference 
between these two approaches is significant,” offering two reasons.201 
First, the core of a federal head of power “might not capture the scope or 
potential reach of federal legislative jurisdiction”.202 Second, “it is 
possible for an entity to be federally regulated in part and provincially 
regulated in part.”203 No further explanation was provided. 
In contrast, the Chief Justice and Fish J., stressed that “the essence of 
the functional test … is whether the function falls within the core of a 
federal power.”204 The two-stage test proposed by Abella J., however, 
would mean that labour jurisdiction would be determined in many  
cases before consideration of the relevant federal power is reached.  
Such an approach “hollows out the functional test” such that if the 
“normal activities look provincial on their face, it would not need to go 
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further”.205 Excluding explicit consideration of the federal power in the 
first stage of the test “would negate the federal power”.206  
Though both opinions reached identical conclusions in these cases — 
that there was no federal jurisdiction — the real significance of the 
distinction between their respective approaches is likely more palpable in 
spheres outside the Aboriginal context. Here, the Chief Justice and Fish 
J. accepted that the scope of the federal power over Indians in section 
91(24) is “admittedly narrow”.207 As a result, it was difficult to see the 
core of that federal power impaired on these facts. However, in the 
context of a different federal power — aeronautics comes to mind — that 
may not be the case.  
3. Criminal Law and Health 
(a)  Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act  
After a victory for the federal Attorney General in Lacombe and 
COPA and a victory for provincial attorneys general in NIL/TU,O and 
Native Child, the Court split the baby with the AHRA Reference, the most 
significant of the five federalism cases decided in 2010. The decision, the 
text of which exceeded 35,000 words, is the epitome of the federalism 
fracture within the McLachlin Court: four justices, led by the Chief 
Justice, sided with the federal government position; four, led by LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ., sided with the provincial government, and one, 
Cromwell J., uncomfortably concurred in part with both camps.  
The Assisted Human Reproduction Act,208 the law in question, has a 
long and complicated history. In short, 10 years after a royal commission 
made its recommendations and following five failed attempts, Parliament 
passed the law in 2004. The Act contains a regulatory scheme — divided 
into “prohibited activities” and “controlled activities” — plus supporting 
provisions designed to administer and enforce the scheme. At the 
Supreme Court, the manner in which the case was presented focused the 
issue specifically on the federal criminal law power. Quebec, which 
initiated the case with a reference to its court of appeal, did not challenge 
the constitutionality of the prohibited activities, which it accepted as 
                                                                                                             
205  Id. (emphasis in original). 
206  Id., at para. 60. 
207  Id., at para. 73. 
208  S.C. 2004, c. 20. 
38 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
valid under the criminal law power, and instead focused solely on the 
controlled activities and the supporting regime. The federal government 
chose to defend the law exclusively under section 91(27). In other words, 
there was a clear contest of two powers: the federal criminal law power 
under section 91(27), on the one hand, and the provincial jurisdiction 
over civil rights and local matters under sections 92(13) and 92(16), on 
the other.  
The two camps at the Supreme Court were divided on both the con-
trolled activities and the supporting regime. The Chief Justice, joined by 
Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ., concluded that the controlled activities, in 
pith and substance, were valid under the criminal law power and that the 
supporting regime was valid under the ancillary powers doctrine. Justices 
LeBel and Deschamps, joined by Abella and Rothstein JJ., disagreed on 
both counts. The disagreement between the two groups is notable less for 
the substantive holding than the markedly different jurisprudential 
approaches to determining the law’s validity. Once that difference is 
understood, the bases for the actual determinations of each group flow 
easily. Justice Cromwell, the most junior justice on the bench, disagreed 
with both camps on their approaches. After charting his own path, 
however, he ultimately agreed with parts of the substantive holding in 
each plurality opinion, thus achieving an uneasy middle ground. 
The essential question in AHRA Reference was stated with character-
istic clarity by the Chief Justice: 
The issue is as follows: Is the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
properly characterized as legislation to curtail practices that may 
contravene morality, create public health evils or put the security of 
individuals at risk, as the Attorney General of Canada contends? Or 
should it be characterized as legislation to promote positive medical 
practices associated with assisted reproduction, as the Attorney General 
of Quebec contends? In pith and substance, what is this legislation 
about? Controlling and curtailing the negative impacts associated with 
artificial human reproduction? Or establishing salutary rules to govern 
the practice of medicine and research in this emerging field?209 
The Chief Justice concluded it would be inappropriate to consider the 
pith and substance of each impugned provision at the beginning of the 
analysis, as she conceded is usually the Court’s practice. Instead, it 
would be more appropriate to consider the scheme as a whole because 
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Quebec was challenging “almost all” of the provisions in the Act. “Under 
these circumstances, it is impossible to meaningfully consider the 
provisions at issue without first considering the nature of the whole 
scheme,” she reasoned.210 Justices LeBel and Deschamps took exception 
with this approach, because “the purposes and effects of a statute’s many 
provisions can be different,” and, accordingly, “it is important to consider 
the impugned provisions separately before considering their connection 
with the other provisions of the statute.”211 Justices LeBel and 
Deschamps criticized the Chief Justice for departing from the approach 
adopted in General Motors,212 which they said was “grounded in 
logic”.213  
Having gone down the path of assessing the Act as a whole, the 
Chief Justice concluded, principally on the basis of its text alone, that its 
purpose was “prohibiting reprehensible conduct by imposing sanc-
tions”.214 The Act “is essentially a series of prohibitions, followed by a 
set of subsidiary provisions for their administration”.215 Crucially, this 
finding impacted the rest of her analysis as she did not see a purposive 
distinction between the controlled activities and the prohibited activities 
to the extent they formed part of a coherent whole. Indeed, she reasoned, 
the controlled activities share the same purpose as the prohibited activi-
ties, namely to discourage reprehensible conduct: “[T]hey prohibit 
conduct, subject to exceptions for practices that Parliament does not 
consider to be harmful.”216 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps, however, cast their gaze more 
broadly in assessing the overall scheme of the Act.217 Relying on “the 
legislative history, from the nature of the activities and from how they are 
presented in the AHR Act”, they concluded the distinction between 
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prohibited and controlled activities expressed a “dichotomy between 
dangerous activities and activities that benefit society”, respectively.218 In 
the latter case, though “Parliament clearly took into account the concerns 
expressed about the ethical and moral aspects and the safety of assisted 
reproductive activities,” it concluded that the activities were “morally 
and socially acceptable”.219 In other words, while the Chief Justice saw a 
coherent scheme whose purpose was to prohibit reprehensible conduct, 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. saw two schemes, one intended to prohibit 
such conduct and another to facilitate and regulate other beneficial 
conduct. The pith and substance of the latter group was “the regulation of 
assisted human reproduction as a health service”.220 
It is reasonably clear what the debate here is about. For LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ., “vague characterizations of the pith and substance of 
provisions” may well lead “not only to the dilution of and confusion with 
respect to the constitutional doctrines that have been developed over the 
years, but also to an erosion of the scope of provincial powers as a result 
of the federal paramountcy doctrine”.221 Put simply, a broader perspec-
tive runs the risk of undermining provincial powers. The Chief Justice is 
alive to this criticism, which she paraphrased as the imposition of 
“national medical standards under the guise of criminal law”, but she 
dismisses it.222 This critical view, the Chief Justice reasoned, “rests on an 
artificial dichotomy between reprehensible conduct and beneficial 
practices,” which leads — incorrectly — to a finding of two distinct 
purposes where there is only one.223 Though she acknowledged that the 
Act will have beneficial effects — “one hopes all criminal laws will have 
beneficial effects” — and that it may impact provincial matters, “neither 
its dominant purpose nor its dominant effect is to set up a regime to 
regulate and promote the benefits of artificial reproduction in hospitals 
and laboratories.”224 At bottom, “it is open to Parliament to create 
regulatory schemes under the criminal law power, provided they further 
the law’s criminal law purpose.”225 
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The debate between the two camps is especially interesting for the 
weight each places on ensuring morality as a valid criminal law purpose. 
For the Chief Justice, her colleagues’ view threatened “Parliament’s 
power to enact general norms for the whole of Canada to meet the 
pressing moral concerns raised by the techniques of assisted reproduc-
tion”.226 She criticized LeBel and Deschamps JJ. for substituting “a 
judicial view of what is good and what is bad for the wisdom of Parlia-
ment”.227 On the other side, however, LeBel and Deschamps JJ., pointing 
to the Margarine Reference,228 reasoned that the validity of a criminal 
law provision presupposes that “that the evil or threat [to be addressed] 
must be real”.229 Here, however, they found no such threat: “Assisted 
human reproduction was not then, nor is it now, an evil needing to be 
suppressed.”230 The bottom line for LeBel and Deschamps JJ. was that 
“care must be taken not to view every social, economic or scientific issue 
as a moral problem” because otherwise “the federal criminal law power 
would in reality have no limits.”231 
The two camps also disagreed in their assessment of the impact on 
provincial affairs. Justices LeBel and Deschamps pointed to “ample 
proof of the effect” that the federal regulatory scheme had on “the 
practice of medicine” in Quebec.232 For them, “the fact that the impugned 
provisions have a significant effect on activities that generally fall within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces confirms that those provisions 
represent an overflow of the exercise of the federal criminal law 
power.”233 That “overflow”, combined with lack of a sufficient nexus to 
suppressing evil, led LeBel and Deschamps JJ. to conclude there was no 
double aspect.234 This reasoning, however, was a non-answer to the Chief 
Justice, because she would have found the provisions valid under the 
double aspect doctrine. “In holding that the double aspect doctrine does 
not apply to this field of double occupancy”, the Chief Justice wrote, 
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“my colleagues assert a new approach of provincial exclusivity that is 
supported by neither precedent nor practice.”235 
After the Chief Justice and LeBel and Deschamps JJ. had collectively 
taken 282 paragraphs to present their opinions, Cromwell J. appeared on 
the scene to cast the tie-breaking vote in an opinion that was just 13 
paragraphs long. He disagreed with both camps as to the pith and sub-
stance of the impugned provisions, holding that they went “far beyond” 
even what LeBel and Deschamps JJ. had found and, in his view, included 
“regulation of virtually every aspect of research and clinical practice in 
relation to assisted human reproduction”.236 On that basis, he agreed that 
most of the provisions “cannot be characterized as serving any criminal 
law purpose recognized by the Court’s jurisprudence”.237 However, he 
singled out two provisions concerning consent and the age of consent, 
which he concluded “fall within the traditional boundaries of criminal 
law”, and a third, which merely “defines the scope” of an uncontested 
prohibition, as valid.238 Crucially, Cromwell J. took no view on some of 
the most contested issues in the plurality opinions, including most notably 
the place of morality in assessing the validity of a criminal law.  
After one of the longest gestation periods in recent memory — 
nearly 20 months — the unsatisfying result in the AHRA Reference is 
unsurprising. Nonetheless, it underscores the malleability and uncertainty 
inherent in the tests employed by the Court in its federalism jurispru-
dence, especially with respect to the section 91(27) federal criminal law 
power. The case appears to stand for little more than the proposition that 
one should check-in again in the future for the Court’s take on the limits 
of the criminal law power. Observers will have that opportunity in 
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services.239 
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IV. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS CASES 
1. Treaty Interpretation 
(a)  Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses 
The Court’s decision in Moses represents its first foray into the in-
terpretation of a “modern” First Nations treaty. It proved to be a 
difficult case for the Court, taking nearly a year after the hearing to be 
handed down, with the justices split 5-4 along lines reminiscent of the 
year’s federalism cases. The division was largely one of the parties’ 
intentions versus the language of the treaty. Justices LeBel and 
Deschamps, writing for the minority and focusing on the intentions of 
the parties, charged that the majority “would now condone a decision 
by the federal government to unilaterally renege on its own solemn 
promises”.240 Justice Binnie, writing for the majority and focusing on 
the text itself, acknowledged this “very serious allegation”, but added 
that he could “find no support whatsoever for this harsh condemnation 
in the body of the Treaty …”.241 
At the core of the dispute in this case is the proper interpretation of 
the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. The Treaty, signed in 
1975 by Canada, Quebec and Aboriginal peoples including the Cree 
Nation, was an “epic achievement”.242 Broadly speaking, the Treaty was 
“designed to fulfill obligations assumed by Quebec towards Aboriginal 
peoples at the time of the transfer of approximately 410,000 square miles 
of land and lakes from Canada’s northern territories to Quebec in 1898 
and 1912”.243 The question here was whether a mining project within the 
territory covered by the Treaty and thus subject to federal scrutiny under 
the Fisheries Act244 was nevertheless exempted from such review by 
virtue of the Treaty. All parties agreed that, under the Treaty regime, 
responsibility for the project’s core environmental impact assessment lay 
with the province. But they also agreed that the federal Fisheries Minister 
had to issue a permit for the project to proceed under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act.245 The disagreement thus concerned 
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whether the federal minister was entitled to conduct an independent 
assessment of the project before issuing the permit (Canada’s position) or 
if he had to forgo such an assessment and instead defer to the conclusions 
reached by the provincial administrator acting under the Treaty regime 
(Quebec’s position). The Cree Nation adopted a middle-ground position, 
advocating a concurrent federal review within the Treaty regime in order 
to ensure adequate consultation with the Aboriginal community.  
At the Court, both sides agreed that the Treaty was, in fact, a treaty 
for purposes of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Justice Binnie 
quickly concluded that there was “no doubt” that the Treaty was “clearly 
covered” under the provision.246 The minority engaged in a lengthy 
analysis on this question — spanning some 25 paragraphs — but arrived 
at the same conclusion.247 However, they took a more expansive view of 
the document as well. The James Bay Treaty, according to LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ., was also “an intergovernmental agreement between the 
federal government and the province of Quebec”.248 Such manifestations 
of modern cooperative federalism have “become increasingly common-
place in Canada”.249 Accordingly, they reasoned, “[t]he status of the 
Agreement as both a constitutional document that protects rights and a 
supra-legislative intergovernmental agreement must remain at the 
forefront of this Court’s analysis.”250 The latter conclusion — that the 
Treaty spoke also to the nature of the federalist relationship — can 
explain much of the disagreement between the minority and majority. 
As for the task of interpretation, Binnie J. began his analysis citing 
the observation in Badger251 by Cory J. that Aboriginal “[t]reaties are 
analogous to contracts, albeit of a very solemn and special, public 
nature.”252 Justice Binnie concluded that the contract analogy is “even 
more apt in relation to a modern comprehensive treaty whose terms 
(unlike in 1899) are not constituted by an exchange of verbal promises 
reduced to writing in a language many of the Aboriginal signatories did 
not understand”.253 In contrast, “[t]he text of modern comprehensive 
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treaties is meticulously negotiated by well-resourced parties.”254 Justices 
LeBel and Deschamps, however, were of the view that since the Treaty 
was covered by section 35, there was no reason to depart from the 
Court’s traditional interpretive approach. The critical issue was whether 
the “context in which an agreement was negotiated and signed, not to the 
date of its signature”, warranted application of the principles used with 
historic treaties.255  
Justice Binnie rejected Quebec’s contention that the Treaty was “ex-
haustive” when it comes to environmental matters in the area.256 Rather, 
as he interpreted the language of its provisions, “all federal laws of 
general application respecting environmental protections apply insofar as 
they are not inconsistent with the Treaty.”257 There was no inconsistency, 
so both procedures “internal” to the treaty and those “external” to it must 
be followed.258 Nevertheless, Binnie J. noted that the federal government 
“must” apply the CEAA procedure in a way that “fully respects” the  
duty to consult on matters affecting the Cree Nation’s rights under  
the Treaty.259 
For LeBel and Deschamps JJ., however, it was clear that the parties 
intended to streamline and consolidate the environmental assessment 
process for the James Bay area under the Treaty regime. Most signifi-
cantly, they observed that, “[i]n light of the constitutional normative 
hierarchy, the CEAA cannot prevail to impose a parallel process in addition 
to the ones provided for in the Agreement.”260 To allow an alternative 
interpretation “would mean that the federal government can unilaterally 
alter what was intended to be a comprehensive, multilateral scheme”.261  
It is possible to exaggerate the difference between the majority’s fo-
cus on the text of the treaty and the minority’s preference for a more 
expansive interpretative approach. As the Court’s subsequent decision in 
Little Salmon shows, both sides look to the language of a modern Treaty 
— even getting into the minutiae — and both sides take into account 
contextual factors surrounding the special relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that Abella 
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and Charron JJ., who joined the minority opinion in Moses, joined Binnie 
J.’s opinion for the majority in Little Salmon. It may be then that the 
divisiveness of Moses was fuelled more by the special division-of-
powers element that existed in these facts.  
2. The Duty to Consult 
Rio Tinto and Little Salmon are the fourth and fifth in a recent series 
of seminal cases to address the Crown’s “duty to consult” with Aborigi-
nal peoples.262 Rio Tinto clarifies the Crown’s duty to consult in cases 
where no treaty has been signed but where there are existing historical 
grievances; Little Salmon, building on the approach adopted in Moses, 
speaks to the Crown’s obligations in the context of modern-day, legally 
sophisticated treaty. 
(a)  Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council 
Rio Tinto clarifies what triggers a duty to consult. The facts in this 
case began in the 1950s, when British Columbia authorized the building 
of a dam for the production of hydro power. The dam and reservoir 
altered the water flows to the Nechako River, which the Carrier Sekani 
First Nations have historically used for fishing and sustenance. Construc-
tion of the dam occurred without consulting with the First Nation. 
Recently, British Columbia sought approval of a contract for the sale of 
excess power from the dam. The question was whether the B.C. Utilities 
Commission was required to consider the issue of consultation with the 
First Nation in determining whether the sale is in the public interest.  
The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the 
test from Haida Nation, the Court’s seminal case on the duty to consult, 
can be broken down into three elements: first, the Crown’s knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of a potential Aboriginal claim or right; second, 
the contemplated Crown conduct; and third, the potential that the 
contemplated conduct may adversely affect an Aboriginal claim or right. 
Only the third element was at issue in Rio Tinto. Here, “[t]he claimant 
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must show a causal relationship between the proposed government 
conduct or decision and a potential for adverse impacts on pending 
Aboriginal claims or rights. Past wrongs, including previous breaches of 
the duty to consult, do not suffice.”263 
The Chief Justice rejected a broader notion of the duty to consult, 
which was urged on her by the First Nation. “The argument for a broader 
duty to consult invokes the logic of the fruit of the poisoned tree,” she 
observed. “Yet, as Haida Nation pointed out, the failure to consult gives 
rise to a variety of remedies, including damages.”264 In other words, a 
past wrong without more — without an adverse impact — is not enough. 
The purpose of a duty to consult, she reasoned, is “to prevent damage to 
Aboriginal claims and rights while claim negotiations are underway”.265 
Without a potential immediate or future adverse impact, however, a past 
wrong lacks any causal connection to the proposed activity, even if it 
does have a historical connection. 
(b)  Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
Little Salmon was the second case in 2010, after Moses, to tackle the 
interpretation of modern treaties between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples. Here, the question was whether a modern treaty served as a 
“complete code” governing the relationship between the treaty signato-
ries or whether the constitutional common law, including a duty to 
consult, affected the terms of the relationship. Over the forceful objection 
of Deschamps J., the Court concluded the latter, offering further clarity 
on its earlier decision in Moses. 
The treaty at issue here was the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
Final Agreement, which was finalized in 1996 and ratified by members 
of the First Nation in 1997. It was a “monumental achievement”.266 The 
facts concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the 
Yukon territorial government to approve the grant of surrendered land to 
a Yukon resident. The plot bordered on the settlement lands of the  
Little Salmon/Carmacks Nation. Though no party claimed that Yukon 
had violated the Treaty, the First Nation contended that the territorial 
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government proceeded without proper consultation. Yukon responded 
that no consultation was required. The treaty referred to consultation in 
over 60 different places but a land grant application was not one of them.  
Justice Binnie, speaking again for a majority of the Court, reprised 
the notion from Moses that “[u]nlike their historical counterparts, the 
modern comprehensive treaty is the product of lengthy negotiations 
between well-resourced and sophisticated parties.”267 To put it simply, 
“[t]he eight pages of generalities in Treaty No. 8 in 1899 is not the 
equivalent of the 435 pages of the [Little Salmon Treaty] almost a 
century later.”268 Because those treaties were typically expressed “in lofty 
terms of high generality and were often ambiguous”, courts were 
“obliged to resort to general principles (such as the honour of the Crown) 
to fill the gaps and achieve a fair outcome”.269 That imperative does not 
exist in the same way in the context of modern treaties which were 
“intended to create some precision around property and governance 
rights and obligations”.270 This leads to the crux — and the tension — of 
Little Salmon: “Where adequately resourced and professionally repre-
sented parties have sought to order their own affairs, and have given 
shape to the duty to consult by incorporating consultation procedures into 
a treaty, their efforts should be encouraged and, subject to such constitu-
tional limitations as the honour of the Crown, the Court should strive to 
respect their handiwork.”271 
According to Binnie J., the precise contours of the duty to consult 
can be shaped by the terms of a modern agreement. Though the Crown 
can never “contract out of its duty of honourable dealing with Aboriginal 
people”, upholding the honour of the Crown “may not always require 
consultation”.272 Justice Binnie allowed that the parties may negotiate a 
different mechanism which, nevertheless, in the result, upholds the 
honour of the Crown. At the same time, however, he rejected the proposi-
tion that “unless consultation is specifically required by the Treaty it is 
excluded by negative inference.”273 Such a view fails to recognize that 
“consultation works to avoid the indifference and lack of respect that can 
                                                                                                             
267  Id., at para. 9. 
268  Id., at para. 52. 
269  Id., at para. 12. 
270  Id. 
271  Id., at para. 54 (emphasis added). 
272  Id., at paras. 61, 71 (emphasis in original). 
273  Id., at para. 55. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)   CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2010 49 
be destructive of the process of reconciliation that the [Treaty] is meant 
to address.”274  
Justice Deschamps, joined by LeBel J., fervently disagreed. First, she 
found that the provisions of the Treaty on their face did require consulta-
tion.275 Second, and more fundamentally, she took strong objection at the 
interpretive approach adopted by Binnie J. At bottom, Deschamps J. 
reasoned that “[t]o add a further duty to consult to these provisions 
would be to defeat the very purpose of negotiating a treaty.”276 According 
to Deschamps J., “[h]aving laboured so hard, in their common interest, to 
substitute a well-defined legal system for an uncertain normative system, 
both the Aboriginal party and the Crown party have an interest in seeing 
their efforts bear fruit.”277 The majority’s approach, she said, undermined 
that effort. To allow one party “to renege unilaterally on its constitutional 
undertaking by superimposing further rights and obligations relating to 
matters already provided for in the treaty could result in a paternalistic 
legal contempt, compromise the national treaty negotiation process and 
frustrate the ultimate objective of reconciliation.”278 In contrast, to give 
“full effect” to the provisions of the Treaty “is to renounce a paternalistic 
approach to relations with Aboriginal peoples” and “to recognize that 
Aboriginal peoples have full legal capacity”.279 
On the facts here, having found that a duty to consult existed, Binnie 
J. looked to the terms of the treaty itself to determine the scope of that 
duty on the basis that “it is a useful indication of what the parties 
themselves considered fair.”280 He concluded that the negotiated defini-
tion was “reasonable statement” of the duty at the “lower end of the 
spectrum” established in Haida Nation.281 He concluded that the record 
established the duty had been fulfilled.282 Justice Deschamps reached a 
similar conclusion, but based on the duty as she understood it, also 
noting that “in some respects they were consulted to an even greater 
extent” than the Treaty required.283 
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Little Salmon, taken together with Moses, thus suggests that while 
modern treaties are different, they are not so different such that the core 
principles that have animated Aboriginal treaty interpretation are no 
longer relevant. Specificity and precision, it seems, will be rewarded 
with judicial deference, provided they do not undermine the honour of 
the Crown. But where a treaty is silent, echoes of the constitutional 
common law will be heard. 
V. VOTING PATTERNS 
Only 56 per cent of constitutional cases in 2010 (14 of 25 cases) 
were unanimous in judgment, in contrast to the overall average for the 
year of 75 per cent.284 Indeed, constitutional cases made up the majority 
of divided cases (11 of 17). Among the divided constitutional cases,285 
Cromwell J., the Court’s most junior justice, boasts a remarkable record 
of not having dissented a single time in 2010.286 He was followed by the 
Chief Justice and Rothstein J., who agreed with the Court’s judgment in 
90 per cent of the split constitutional cases. Justices Binnie and Charron 
made up the remainder of that contingent, joining the majority or 
concurring in judgment in 80 per cent of such cases. On the other end of 
the spectrum, LeBel and Abella JJ. found themselves in dissent in 56 per 
cent of all non-unanimous constitutional cases. Justice Deschamps 
dissented 44 per cent of the time in such cases and Fish J. dissented in 40 
per cent of such cases. 
Notably, dissenting judgments were present in each of the Charter,287 
federalism,288 and Aboriginal289 categories. Unlike past years, however, 
                                                                                                             
284  Even among the 14 cases that were unanimous in judgment, however, the Court some-
times released multiple opinions, some of which diverged significantly from one another in their 
reasoning. See Willier, supra, note 4, NIL/TU,O, supra, note 5; Native Child, supra, note 5, and 
Little Salmon, supra, note 6. For the avoidance of doubt, a split or non-unanimous constitutional 
case is one where at least one justice dissented from the Court’s ultimate holding. 
285  The 11 split cases in 2010 were: Morelli, supra, note 4; National Post, supra, note 4; 
Moses, supra, note 6; Torstar, supra, note 4; Cornell, supra, note 4; Sinclair, supra, note 4; 
McCrimmon, supra, note 4; Lacombe, supra, note 5; COPA, supra, note 5; Gomboc, supra, note 4; 
and AHRA Reference, supra, note 5. AHRA Reference, however, is excluded from the following 
calculations because all the justices, save for Cromwell J., both dissented in part and concurred in 
part. Also, where a justice did not participate in a particular case, it is excluded from their individual 
calculation. 
286  Indeed, Cromwell J. did not dissent in a single case in 2010, constitutional or otherwise. 
287  Thirty-five per cent (6 of 17) Charter cases were split: Morelli; National Post; Torstar; 
Cornell; Sinclair; McCrimmon; and Gomboc (all supra, note 4). 
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the justices were more likely to be unanimous in Charter cases than in 
constitutional cases as a whole, with split decisions amounting to only 35 
per cent of Charter cases. Among those split Charter cases, however, the 
dissent — with just a single exception — favoured the Charter claimant 
over the government.290  
1. Trends in Charter Cases 
Last year, all the justices continued a trend started in 2007: The 
Chief Justice and Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. have only regis-
tered dissenting votes in Charter cases in favour of the rights claimant, 
while Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ. have only cast dissenting 
votes in favour of the government. Justice Cromwell has not cast any 
dissenting votes. 
In the seven non-unanimous Charter cases decided in 2010,291 
Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. consistently registered 
votes supporting the government. In contrast, Abella J. consistently 
supported the Charter claimant (with the exception of her vote in 
Gomboc). Among the remaining justices, Binnie and LeBel JJ. registered 
an almost equal number of votes supporting each of the government and 
the claimant, while the Chief Justice tended to favour the government 
and Fish J. tended to favour the claimant. 
2. Trends in Federalism Cases 
A trio composed of the Chief Justice and Binnie and Fish JJ. evi-
denced a strong federalist leaning in all five federalism cases decided in 
2010. Even in cases that were unanimous in judgment, the three justices 
crafted their own opinions. On the other end of the spectrum, Deschamps 
J. drafted or joined opinions that had a firm orientation in favour of 
provincial jurisdiction. Justice LeBel was a close second in that regard, 
voting with Deschamps J. in all cases except Lacombe. In the middle, 
Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. were the swing block, voting 
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with the majority in all the federalism cases except the AHRA Reference 
(where, of course, Cromwell J. was essentially a majority of one). 
3. Trends in Aboriginal Rights Cases 
With only three cases in 2010, there is not much to analyze here. In 
Moses, however, which had a clear federalism overlay, the usual split in 
the Court re-emerged, but for the fact that Abella and Charron JJ. were 
not in the majority. As with the federalism cases, however, the three 
Aboriginal rights cases confirm the firm differences in jurisprudential 
approach between the Chief Justice and Binnie J., on the one hand, and 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. on the other.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
With 25 cases handed down, many of them highly significant, 2010 
was an important year on the constitutional front. Especially in the 
Charter arena, the Court sees itself as a policymaker and appears to be 
comfortable in that role. It has adopted a cautious, pragmatic approach to 
Charter analysis, eschewing categorical rules in favour of case-by-case 
balancing tests that afford it greater flexibility. Looking to the future, the 
surprise retirements of Binnie J., who could have stayed on the Court for 
another three years, and Charron J., who could have served for another 
15 years, present the government with a significant opportunity to 
influence the direction of the Court. With these retirements, four justices, 
including Rothstein and Cromwell JJ., both of whom are among those 
most consistently in the majority, will have been appointed by the present 
government. Notably, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. agreed with each other 
in 96 per cent of constitutional cases decided in 2010.292 No two justices 
had a higher agreement ratio, though Charron J. came close, agreeing 
with each of Rothstein J. and Cromwell J. in 92 per cent of last year’s 
constitutional cases. In contrast, the relatively more liberal Binnie J. 
joined with Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. only 63 per cent and 67 per cent 
of the time, respectively, in large part because he parted company with 
                                                                                                             
292  Justices Rothstein and Cromwell parted ways only in the AHRA Reference, supra, note 5. 
For purposes of this and the following calculations, two justices are understood to have agreed with 
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his colleagues on multiple Charter cases. This result suggests that, at 
least with respect to constitutional cases, the retirement of Binnie J. may 
be felt more acutely if the jurisprudential disposition of the government’s 
two new appointees is comparable to that of its two sitting appointees. 
Looking further ahead, however, the approaching retirements of LeBel 
and Fish JJ., who are among the most liberal justices on the court and 
who must retire by 2014,293 will present the government with another 
significant opportunity to shape the direction of the Court’s jurisprudence 





                                                                                                             
293  Justice LeBel agreed with Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. in only 57 per cent and 54 per cent 
of constitutional cases, respectively. However, owing to his agreement with them on certain 
federalism cases, Fish J. had a higher agreement ratio with Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. — 63 per 
cent and 67 per cent, respectively — though he frequently parted ways with them in Charter cases. 
 
 
